I recently wrote an editorial arguing that researchers should run fewer statistical tests (Brenner, 2016) . May and Vincent (2017) responded by arguing that we need to switch to using Bayesian tests rather than to doing fewer tests. They claimed that Bayesian methods circumvent the problems that I described because they can be applied to any data at any time. They maintained that it is wasteful to ignore potentially exciting discoveries by not testing them. I will try to explain why using Bayesian statistics does not alleviate the need to run fewer tests.
The Bayesian approach has many advantages. The most fundamental advantage is that it allows one to directly judge the likelihood of an effect being present given the data, rather than requiring one to deduce this likelihood from an estimate of the probability of having found such data by chance. One advantage of not having to estimate the latter probability is that one can run the test on the available data without knowing how the experimenter determined when to stop gathering more data (Berger & Berry, 1988) . May and Vincent seem to be suggesting that this makes it acceptable to run many tests. However, although the statistical test only depends on the actual data when using Bayesian tests, defining conditions under which data collection will stop influences the data. Thus, relying on Bayesian tests does not mean that you no longer need to consider the way in which the data were acquired. More importantly, my proposal was to reduce the number of hypotheses that are tested, not the number of tests run on a single hypothesis. Irrespective of whether one infers the presence of a certain effect from the fact that a Bayesian test provides strong evidence to support it (Kruschke, 2013; Wagenmakers, 2007) or because a t-test was significant, there is still a chance that there is actually no effect. It is this chance that makes it important to run fewer tests. To understand why, it might help to consider the problem from the point of view of someone reading an article rather than from the point of view of an author.
Consider reading an article in which the authors conducted a statistical test and inferred from the outcome of the test that there is an effect. How confident should you be that there really is an effect? To get an idea, consider two overall (unknown) prior probabilities: the probability that there actually is an effect, P(actual), and the probability that the outcome of a statistical test will allow the authors to infer that there is an effect, P(inferred). These two probabilities are hopefully not independent, because we hope that the outcome of a statistical test tells us something about the probability of the effect being present, so we relate them with Bayes' rule.
Since one can infer that there is an effect both when there actually is an effect and when there actually is none
and the only options are that there actually is an effect or there actually is none
we can rewrite the equation as
Your confidence that there actually is an effect when the presence of an effect is inferred from a statistical test should obviously depend on the probability of this being true, P(actualjinferred). Equation (1) shows how this probability depends on three measures: the likelihood of inferring that there is an effect when there actually is an effect, P(inferredjactual); the likelihood of inferring that there is an effect when actually there is none, P(inferredjactuallyNone); and the probability of there actually being an effect, P(actual). You should feel confident about an inferred effect if the first measure is large, the second measure is small, and the third measure is large (and consequently, 1ÀP(actual) is small). The first two measures depend on how strong the evidence needs to be for the authors to accept that there is an effect (possibly the significance level, a, or a measure based on the Bayes Factor; Wagenmakers, 2007) . Both measures depend on this choice in a similar manner, but presumably increasing the required evidence will usually have a stronger influence when there is actually no effect, so it might be logical to have more confidence if the authors demanded stronger evidence, so that P(inferredjactuallyNone) is small. Of course, having found stronger evidence should increase your confidence in the inferred effect anyway. Unfortunately, if we, as a scientific community, decide to only consider evidence when it is stronger than we currently accept, we will all need to collect more data. The idea of my original editorial (Brenner, 2016) was to increase the overall reliability of inferred effects by shifting the distribution of values of P(actual) to larger magnitudes. I proposed to achieve this by not running tests on measures for which this magnitude is likely to be small. This should reduce the number of inferred effects that cannot be replicated. However, one can also approach this issue from the perspective of an individual test. If the test in question is a t-test or analysis of variance, the p-value reported in the article provides us with P(inferredjactuallyNone). Bayesian tests do not rely on this p-value, so they will generally not report it, but for simplicity, I will refer to P(inferredjactuallyNone) as a p-value in the rest of this editorial, irrespective of whether it is a traditional p-value or the likelihood of incorrectly inferring that there is an effect on the basis of a Bayesian test. The probability that there actually is an effect, P(actual), is obviously not known, but Equation (1) can be used to examine how confidence in an inferred effect should depend on the value that one expects for P(actual), the prior probability of the effect being present. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of Equation (1). It shows how likely it is that there is an effect, given that the authors reported that the data allowed them to infer that there was an effect, as a function of the prior probability of there being an effect. Thus, the curves show P(actualjinferred) as a function of P(actual). This is shown for various likelihoods of inferring that there is an effect when there actually is an effect (multiple curves), both for a p-value of .05 (left panel) and for a p-value of .01 (right panel). To help interpret the figure, first consider the situation in which actual effects are always found: P(inferredjactual)¼1 (thick red curves). If an effect is equally likely to be present as absent (prior probability of 50%; green disks), finding a p value of .05 indicates that the probability of the effect actually being present is about .95. Finding a p value of .01 indicates that the probability of the effect being present is about .99. This nicely corresponds with what one might (incorrectly) expect these p values to mean. Thus, conversely, when a paper reports a p value of .05 using a t test, interpreting it as there being a 95% chance of the effect being present is more or less equivalent to assuming that the prior probability of the effect being present was 50%.
If it is quite unlikely that there would be an effect (prior probability of 1%, blue circles), the probability that an inferred effect is actually present is only .17 for a p value of .05 and only .50 for a p value of .01. If not all true effects are found (thin curves; P(inferredjactual)<1 in Equation (1)), as might happen if the effects are small with respect to the random variability in the data, the probability that inferred effects are actually present is even smaller. Figure 1 illustrates why one's confidence in inferred effects should be small when the effects seem very unlikely. Bayesian tests make it possible to consider the fact that the effect is initially considered to be very unlikely. When using Bayesian tests to update beliefs about hypotheses, all one needs to do is to give an unlikely hypothesis a small prior probability. In that case, finding compelling evidence to support the hypothesis should only make you consider the hypothesis to be slightly more plausible. I see no fundamental objection to running many Bayesian tests in this way, but in practice, I doubt whether it is worthwhile running and reporting statistics just to make such vague claims, especially since it will be very difficult to justify the precise value of the prior probability of a very unlikely effect (and this value will be fundamental for the interpretation). Trying to avoid such inevitable subjectivity (Berger & Berry, 1988) by only reporting how the probability should be updated (Wagenmakers, 2007) obviously reintroduces the problem. Thus, using Bayesian tests with explicit priors to evaluate unlikely effects does not appear to be a viable alternative to running fewer tests. Figure 1 . The probability that an effect that is inferred from a statistical test is actually present (vertical axis), as a function of the prior probability of the effect being present (horizontal axis), for various likelihoods of inferring that there is an effect if it is actually present (curves; likelihoods increasing from 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1). The left and right panels show values for two different values of P(inferredjactuallyNone). Blue circles and green disks indicate the values for prior probabilities of .01 and .5, respectively, when one is sure to infer that there is an effect if there actually is one.
An advantage of using Bayesian methods is that they make it simple to decrease the probability of finding support for an incorrect hypothesis by specifying the effect that you expect to find. Testing for a specific effect rather than for any non-zero effect obviously reduces the probability of inferring that there is an effect when there is none. For the tests for which a study was designed, one can usually specify the expected effect to some extent, because there must have been some reason for conducting the study. When testing for unexpected effects, there is, by definition, no specific expectation.
Thus, any way you consider this issue, if we want our scientific findings to be more reproducible we should avoid testing for unlikely effects. This will seldom influence the main hypothesis under study, because there must have been some reason for doing the study, so it would be strange if the prior probability of finding an effect were negligible. The introduction of a paper usually explains why it is not negligible. The problems arise when authors run additional tests to make better use of the data, in the hope of inadvertently finding something exciting, or because reviewers or editors ask them to try to validate unexpected observations. Of course, if you see something unexpected in your data you should report it and possibly investigate it by collecting new data, but running statistics on it is meaningless, at best. Specifically, we need to stop running tests for which the prior probability of finding an effect is very low. I have mentioned various advantages of using Bayesian tests, and there are undoubtedly more, but making it harmless to run many tests in the hope that some such tests reveal something interesting is not one of them.
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